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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INTERSTATE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIESSTATE'S PROPRIETARY. INTEREST IN ITS NATURAL REsoURcEs-Plaintiffs,
non-residents of South Carolina, brought action to enjoin enforcement of the
South Carolina statutes regulating :fishing within the three mile maritime belt.
The statutes imposed an annual license fee on boats engaged in shrimp :fishing
of $25.00, if owned by residents, and of $2500.00, if owned by non-residents;
it exacted a tax of ¼ cent per pound on green shrimp taken or "canned, shucked
or shipped for market," and it required all licensed boats to unload, pack and
properly stamp their catch in South Carolina before shipment to another state.
Plaintiffs who fish within and beyond the three-mile limit contended that the
statutes were void on the ground, among others, that they make an arbitrary
discrimination between residents and non-residents in violation of the privileges
and immunities clause, Article IV, section 2 of the United States Constitution,
and that they impose a burden on interstate commerce in violation of sections
8 and IO of Article I. Held, injunction denied and case dismissed. The South
Carolina statutes do not go beyond the power of a state to regulate the taking
of :fish or animals f erae naturae, the ownership of which is in the state for the
benefit of its inhabitants. Toomer v. Witsell, (D.C. S.C. I 94 7) 73 F. Supp.
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A state has an almost absolute power to regulate the taking and disposition
of the wildlife within its borders.1 It may prohibit the taking altogether,2 or
limit it to its citizens.3 It may permit the taking, but prevent the exportation:'
It may tax the taking or the possession of wildlife by anyone, 5 or it may tax
only taking or possession by non-residents. 6 In order to make its regulations
effective, it may prohibit the possession of game whether taken within its borders_
or not.7 This power over wildlife has been justified upon the ground that animals
and :fish ferae naturae are the common property of the citizens of a state and the
state can conserve them for its citizens; 8 this power has survived attacks on
the ground that it violated either the commerce clause or the priVI1eges and
immunities clause of Article IV, or both.1' In Foster Fountain Packing Co. v.
1
Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 16 S.Ct. 600 (1896); McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876).
2
Rupert v. United States, (C.C.A. 8th, 1910) 181 F. 87.
8
McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876); Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232
U.S. 138, 34 S.Ct. 281 (1914).
4
Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 16 S.Ct. 600 (1896); McDonald & Johnson v. Southern Express Co., (C.C. S.C. 1904) 134 F. 282.
6
La Coste v. Dept. of Conservation of Louisiana, 263 U.S. 545, 44 S.Ct. 186
(1924).
6
In re Eberle, (C.C. Ill. 1899) 98 F. 295.
7
Silz v. Hesterberg, 2II U.S. 31, 29 S.Ct. 10 (1908).
8
Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 16 S.Ct. 600 (1896).
9
Ibid; Rupert v. United States, (C.C.A. 8th, 1910) 181 F. 87; La Coste v.
Dept. of Conservation of Louisiana, 263 U.S. 545, 44 S.Ct. 186 (1924) (Commerce
Clause); Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. No. 3230 (1823); In re Eberle, (C.C. Ill.
1899) 98 F. 295 (Privileges and Immunities, Art. IV, sec. 2); McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876) (both).
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Haydel,1° the Supreme Court was confronted with a Louisiana statute which
authorized the taking of raw shrimp, its manufacture and 'sale in interstate
commerce, but which forbade the exportation of uncleaned shrimp. The court,
in holding the statute invalid, declared that although it was passed ostensibly
for conservation, its real purpose was to force canning industries using Louisiana
shrimp to move into the state; and that, although a state may retain its wildlife
within its borders for conservation and use, once it permits interstate sale the
·product becomes subject to the commerce clause. In Bayside Fish Co. v.
· Gentry, 11 the court upheld a California statute which regulated the manufacture
of fish products within the state and in distinguishing the Foster case, pointed
out that there was nothing in the California statute which suggested a purpose
to interfere with interstate commerce and that it plainly appeared to be a conservation measure. This power over game has also been recognized to a limited
extent over other natural resources,- but in such cases it seems to rest upon a
police power basis and is much more limited.12 Thus, a state can prevent the
waste of its 'mineral resources, 13 and tax their extraction or manufacture,14 but
it cannot prevent or discourage their exportation.15 The statute in the principal
10
278 U.S. 1, 49 S.Ct. I (1928). The reasoning used by the court in allowing
a state to prohibit exportation of its shrimp, but in not allowing it to permit exportation subject to the, condition that the shrimp be manufactured in the state, appears
to be similar to that used in allowing a state to exclude foreign corporations, but in
not allowing it to admit. them subject to the condition that they agree not to remove
suits to federal courts. Home Insurance Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall. (87 U.S.) 445
(1874). For a discussion of unconstitutional conditions, see Merrill, "Unconstitutional
Conditions," 77 UNiv. PA. L. REv. 879 (1929); Hale, "U)lconstitutional Conditions
and Constitutional Rights," 35 CoL. L. REv. 321 (1935).
11
297 U.S. 422, 56 S.Ct. 513 (1936).
.
12
In Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 16 S.Ct. 600 (1896), the Court
based the power of a state over its wildlife on two grounds: its property interest as
trustee for its inhabitants, and its police power. Most decisions accept the former
ground for the wildlife and the latter for other natural resources. West v. Kansas
Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229, 31 S.Ct. 564 (1911); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia,
,262 U.S. 553, 43 S.Ct. 658 (1923). Justice Holmes felt that authority over both
game and other natural resources was based upon police power. Hudson Water Co.
v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 28 S.Ct. 529 (1908). He believed that a state could
make reasonable provisions for its local needs and could regulate all natural resources
before they went into interstate commerce irrespective of their effect upon it. This
was the basis of his dissent in Wells v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., and in Pennsylvania
v. West Virginia. For an exhaustive annotation of cases dealing with natural resources,
see 32 A.L.R. 331 (1924).
13
Walls v. Midland, 254 U.S. 300, 41 S.Ct. 118 (1920); Ohio Oil Co. v.
Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 20 S.Ct. 576 (1900); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co,,
220 U.S. 61, 31 S.Ct. 337 (1911).
14
Heisler v. Thomas Colliery, 260 U.S. 245, 43 S.Ct. 83 (1922) (coal); Oliver
Iron Co. v. Lord, 262 U.S. 172, 43 S.Ct. 526 (1923) (iron); Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 281 U.S. 146, 50 S.Ct. 310 (1930) (oil); Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall, 274
U.S. 284, 47 S.Ct. 639 (1927) (gas); South Carolina Power Co. v. South Carolina
Tax Commission, (D.C. S.C. 1931) 52 F. (2d) 515 (electricity).
15
Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 43 S.Ct. 658 (1923); West v.
Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229, 31 S.Ct. 564 (1911). But see Hudson Water
Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 28 S.Ct. 529 (1908).
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case clearly discriminates against non-residents, but it is submitted that the state
has not exceeded its power and that the case if appealed should be affirmed.

Daniel W. Reddin, III

